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The paper analyzes the implications of local and global pollution when two types of abate-
ment activities can be undertaken. One type reduces solely local pollution (e.g., use of par-
ticulate matter lters) while the other mitigates global pollution as well (e.g., application of
fuel saving technologies). In the framework of a 2-country endogenous growth model, the
implications of dierent assumptions about the degree to which global externalities are inter-
nalized are analyzed. Subsequently, we derive policy rules adapted to the dierent scenarios.
Special attention is paid to pollution, growth and optimal policy in the case of asymmetric
internalization.
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bao, Spain.1 Introduction
When analyzing abatement activities that aim at combating climate change, it is
mostly assumed that this abatement solely reduces the emission of CO2 or other green-
house gases. In reality however, many activities that reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases also reduce local pollution. Consequently, when discussing climate policies, not
only the returns from abating global pollution but also from reducing local pollution
should be considered. Equivalently, when deciding about policies to reduce local pol-
lution, the analysis of available abatement options should take potential side eects
on global pollution into account. Thus, local and global environmental policies should
not be treated separately but rather in a unied framework. In this paper, we set up
a model that accounts for local as well as global pollution and explicitly considers two
types of abatement activities that dier with respect to their implications regarding
local and global pollution mitigation. Using this approach, we can not only derive
consequences of dierent degrees of internalization for both pollution types, but we
can also characterize policies that result in an optimal abatement mix, pollution stock
and growth.1
Take the reduction of CO2-emissions from transport as one example that reduces
global as well as local pollutants. Decreasing fossil fuel combustion by increasing tech-
nological eciency not only decreases the emissions of greenhouse gases like CO2, CH4
and N2O but also reduces emissions of, e.g., particulate matter, SO2 and NOx. Conse-
quently, negative eects of these pollutants like health problems, acid rain, and surface
corrosion are mitigated as well (see, e.g., R ubbelke 2002). Similarly, aforestation and
deforestation not only enhance carbon sequestration but can also reduce soil erosion
and foster bio-diversity.2 In the literature on climate change, these additional benets
which are mostly of a local nature (see, e.g., Pearce 1992, IPCC 1996) are often re-
ferred to as `ancillary benets', implying that the main benet lies in the reduction of
greenhouse gases. A more neutral term is `co-benets' (see IPCC 2001) which leaves
1In this paper, we only dierentiate between global and local pollution where the latter includes
all types of non-global pollution (e.g. regional).
2For specic types of additional benets from climate policies see, e.g., Burtraw et al. (2003)
regarding the mitigation of local and regional air pollution; Barker, Johnstone and O'Shea (1993)
with respect to the reduction of noise, road surface damage and trac congestion and Elbakidze and
McCarl (2007) on the prevention of soil erosion and of biodiversity loss. Potential rises in employment
levels, competitiveness and energy security are treated by Bovenberg (1999) and Porter (1991) and
IEA (2007) respectively.
2undecided whether the primary target is the mitigation of global or local pollution.
These co-benets are often neglected although they are estimated to be of consider-
able size (see, e.g., Pearce 2000).3 Consequently, a comprehensive analysis of the costs
and benets of, e.g., the global warming problem should incorporate co-benets from
preventing greenhouse gas emissions (see also Morgenstern 1991, Plambeck, Hope and
Anderson 1997).
In our paper we therefore include two types of pollution { local ow pollution
and global stock pollution { as well as two types of abatement. Abatement either
aects local pollution only, or local and global pollution simultaneously. The former
could, for example, refer to lters that reduce the emission of particulate matter. The
latter could be the aforementioned reduction of fuel combustion. Whether its main
target is global or local pollution depends on the aim of the policy maker. Considering
these dierent pollution and abatement types and their interrelations, we analyze their
eects on dierent internalization strategies and environmental policies.
In order to include not only the intertemporal spillovers from CO2-accumulation
but also their transnational nature, we consider two countries that each produces and
pollutes. To keep the focus on the internalization of the pollution externalities, we
employ an AK-type endogenous growth model in which no other market failures arise.
We also abstract from any ows of goods or capital between countries, such that the
two economies only aect each other through transnational pollution spillovers.
A look at the related literature shows that, so far, most papers that consider
both - local as well as global - benets from pollution abatement have been case
studies assessing the level of ancillary benets for individual regions or countries (e.g.,
Gielen and Chen 2001, Li 2006) or have been analytical models which employed static
approaches neglecting dynamic implications (e.g., Pittel and R ubbelke 2008; Finus
and R ubbelke 2008).4
The strand of analytical literature that deals with the dynamics of economic de-
3Regarding early climate-damage estimates, for example, Pearce (1992) argued that the consider-
ation of co-benets would increase Nordhaus' highest marginal-damage estimate of US$ 66 per ton of
carbon to more than US$ 150.
4Furthermore, a number of studies have assessed specic co-benets benets of climate policies,
especially in terms of public health. For surveys of the literature see, for example, Ekins (1996) and
Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2000). As in our paper, most studies explore short-term, local co-benets,
only a few include long-term co-benets at a global scale (see, e.g. Eyckmans and Bertrand 2000 and
Tol 2002).
3velopment, and the growth-pollution nexus specically, usually considers either ow
or stock pollution but does not take potential interrelations into account (e.g., With-
agen 1995, Smulders and Gradus 1996, Schou 2000, 2002). Furthermore, it is rarely
distinguished between local and global pollution as most approaches assume closed
economies. One exception is the paper by Bahn and Leach (2008) who consider
secondary eects of climate policy due to the reduction of SO2 emissions in an over-
lapping generation model. Their model is, however, not analytical solvable, such
that transmission channels of secondary benets and costs are not clearly identiable.
An analytical solvable paper that considers transnational spillovers in an endogenous
growth setting is Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994). Yet, their paper focusses on
renewable resources and takes neither global versus local pollution nor environmental
spillovers into account.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: After the introduction of the
model in Section 2, we consider four dierent internalization scenarios that are imple-
mented by a central planner in Section 3. These scenarios dier a) in the degree of
internalization of the global externality and b) with respect to the symmetry of inter-
nalization in the two countries. In Section 4 we then consider dierent policy options
to decentralize the planner solutions and evaluate them regarding their potential to
achieve the intertemporal global welfare optimum. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Two countries i, i = h;f, produce a homogeneous output from capital. The input of
capital generates two types of pollution which dier with respect to the scale of their
geographical impact. For simplicity we assume the two countries to be identical with
respect to their production technologies as well as preferences. It is assumed that
neither capital nor goods or labor are exchanged between the two countries, such that
we can fully concentrate on the local and global environmental externalities.
The externality created by the rst type of pollution, PG, is of a global nature, i.e.
it aects production in both countries. The obvious example that comes to mind is
the case of CO2. Due to the long-period of time it takes for CO2 to be absorbed in the
atmosphere, we assume that these emissions build up a renewable pollution stock, S,
5For a review of the literature on economic development and pollution with a focus on more recent
endogenous growth based approaches, see Pittel (2002).
4that degenerates at rate a. As both countries generate pollution, the pollution stock
dynamics are given by
_ S = Ph
G + P
f
G   aS (1)
with _ S = dS
dt . For simplicity we assume that capital, K, generates pollution in a
constant emission ratio pG. The emission of pollution can be reduced by abatement,






; i = h;f: (2)
The second type of pollution we consider, PL, induces a negative local externality that
only aects production negatively in the country in which it is generated. Examples for
this type of pollution might be emission of SO2 or NOx that lead to, e.g., acid rain in
a limited regional range around the point of emission. Having these types of pollution
in mind, PL is assumed to give rise to a ow externality.7 Again we assume pollution
to be generated in xed proportions to the input of capital. The environmental impact
of local pollution is reduced by abatement activities ALG that decrease global as well
as local pollution and by abatement activities AL that specically aim the reduction







LG)1 ; 0 <  < 1 (3)
with pL denoting the emission intensity of capital.
Output, Y , is produced using a linear AK-technology in the tradition of Rebelo
(1991). Both, the global pollution stock and local pollution ow, exert negative eects
on production:
Y i = Ki(Pi
L) S ; ;  > 0;  +  < 1: (4)
It is assumed that the negative productivity eects from the input of capital, i.e. from
pollution, do not overcompensate the positive eects (1       > 0). Output can be
used for consumptive, investive and abatement purposes, such that the equilibrium
condition for the capital market reads
_ Ki = Y i   Ci   Ai
L   Ai
LG: (5)
6As ALG reduces local as well as global pollution, it is indexed LG thus referring to Local and
Global.
7This is of course an approximation which seems, however, justiable when comparing the degra-
dation rates of, e.g., SO2 induced pollution to CO2.
5Finally, households in each country i derive utility from consumption C. The represen-








e t dt  6= 1 (6)
s.t. _ Wi = riWi   Ci
where W denotes total household asset holdings and  is the discount rate.
3 The Planner Solutions
In the following we distinguish between dierent types of planner solutions: First,
it is assumed that the planner only internalizes the local pollution externality but
completely neglects the global externality. Second, he internalizes the eects of local
and global pollution on the domestic economy but does not take into account that
domestic CO2-emissions also cause damages abroad. Third, we consider the social
planner solution in which both externalities are perfectly internalized, independently
of where the damages arise. In a nal subsection we then assume the internalization
regimes to dier across countries, i.e. we consider asymmetric internalization.
3.1 Scenario 1: Internalization of the Local Externality Only
The planner in each country maximizes intertemporal utility of the representative
household, (6), subject to capital accumulation, (5). After inserting (3) and (4) the
















S    Ci   Ai
LG   Ai
L)
where  is the shadow price of capital. Optimization gives rise to the following rst-
order conditions










gi =  (1   )
Y i
Ki (10)
6and the transversality condition for the capital stock, limt!1 iKi = 0. g =
_ 
 is the
growth rate of .











K = Y i
Ki denotes the output-capital-ratio. (1 )Y i
K gives the marginal product
of capital net of local pollution eects.
It will prove useful for the further analysis to determine the capital-abatement ratio
KA = K
ALG as an indicator of the environmental friendliness of a growth path. The
higher KA, the higher the input of polluting capital in relation to pollution reducing
abatement ALG. Alternatively, we could have chosen the capital-abatement ratio with
respect to AL. In Scenario 1 an increase in ALG always implies a simultaneous increase
in AL as (9) shows that the two abatement activities will be employed in a constant









The simple relation in (12) is of course due to the neglect of stock pollution by the
planner. The mitigating eect of ALG on global pollution is not reected in (12) such
that the ratio is biased towards local pollution abatement (see also Subsection 3.3).
Using (4) and (12), KA can be expressed as a function of S only:
Ki













A only depends on the pollution stock and no country specic variables, the
capital-abatement ratio will be identical across countries, i.e. Kh
A = K
f
A, at any point
in time.8 (13) also shows the positive relation between KA and the pollution stock,
i.e. a higher S is due to less abatement relative to capital accumulation.
From (9), the capital-abatement ratio can be expressed as Y i
K = [(1   )Ki
A] 1
where KA is determined by (13). The dynamics of consumption, (11), can thus be














8In case of dierences in the countries' technologies and/or preferences, KA would of course dier
across countries, yet would still only be inuenced by the other country through the pollution stock.
7As KA depends positively on the pollution stock, a higher S implies lower growth.


















as the capital-abatement ratio is equal across countries. Consequently, Ki
A in the
long-run equilibrium is given by
Ki





















The RHS of (16) depends positively on the elasticity of output with respect to
stock pollution, , as well as on the pollution intensities of capital, pL and pG. For any
given capital input and level of abatement, an increase in either of these parameters
reduces output and thereby the marginal product of abatement. Thus the planner
nds its optimal to increase the capital-abatement ratio until the marginal product of
abatement is again equal to its marginal costs. As a result, interestingly, a stronger
eect of pollution on production induces a higher capital-abatement ratio and therefore
higher pollution.
The same eect arises with respect to , the elasticity of output with respect to
ow pollution. Yet, an increase in  also aects the marginal product of abatement
positively as abatement becomes more productive, see (9). Depending on which of







1   , the higher the equilibrium pollution ow, the more likely Ki
A increases
with .
It can be shown that the BGP is locally saddle-path stable by rewriting the dy-
namic system in terms of S and the consumption-capital-ratio, Ci
K, which is constant
along the BGP. From (1), (5) and (14) we get


















9A BGP or long-run equilibrium is dened as a growth path along which all variables grow at
constant rates.
8The eigenvalues in the proximity of the steady state are EV1 = Ci
K > 0 and EV2 =
 a
1  
1  < 0. EV2 is negative as we have assumed that the externalities from capital
do not outweigh its positive eect on production (1    > 0). As one eigenvalue is
negative and our system contains one jump variable and one predetermined variable,
the economy is saddle-path stable.
3.2 Scenario 2: Decentral Internalization of the Global Externality
In contrast to the previous section, we now assume that the planner in each country
takes the eects of global pollution on its own economy into account yet fails to
internalize its transnational eects. The planner maximizes intertemporal welfare
subject to the equations of motion of the capital stock as well as of the pollution













1() is given in (7) and  denotes the shadow price of the pollution stock which
is negative. Due to the internalization of S, the FOCs for ALG and K are modied.
Together with an additional FOC for the pollution stock, the modied FOCs read
after some rearranging
(1   )Y i
KKi


































A + a (19)
plus the transversality condition limt!1 iS = 0.
In comparison to (9), the additional term on the RHS of (17) represents the inter-
nalized return to ALG from mitigating global pollution. The return is the higher, the
higher the negative impact of pollution on welfare relative to the positive welfare eect






, and the higher the marginal impact of abatement











. Due to the additional return from ALG,










respect to (18) and (10), the additional term in (18) reects the internalized costs of
capital in terms of global pollution. Finally, (19) gives the dynamics of , the shadow
9price of the pollution stock. The growth rate of  is determined by the marginal costs
accruing from an additional unit of emissions PG. These costs equal output foregone
due to a marginal addition to the capital stock net of the regeneration rate of S.
From the FOCs we get the modied capital-abatement ratio along the BGP (for






























Comparison with (16) shows that the equilibrium capital-abatement ratio in (20) is
lower due to the internalization of the global externality. The additional term in (20)
reects the reduced incentives to invest in capital due to the negative eect on pro-
ductivity from global pollution. The higher the elasticity of production with respect
to stock pollution, i.e. the higher , the lower the optimal capital-abatement ratio
is compared to Scenario 1. Dependency of the additional term on the consumption-
capital ratio, CK, reects that a higher share of output consumed compared to output
invested lowers the stress on the environment. As a result, the detrimental eect on
the capital-abatement ratio is lower for higher values of CK.
From (15) it follows immediately that the pollution stock along the BGP is the
lower, the lower the capital-abatement ratio. So, as to be expected, internalization of
the global externality induces the long-run pollution stock to fall.10




































10The stability of the transition path under imperfect internalization can be analyzed using a 5x5








A and S. As the capital-abatement
ratio in (20) now depends on the consumption-capital ratio, the countries can follow dierent tran-
sitional paths although KA will be equal across countries along the BGP due to our simplifying
assumption of identical economies. The resulting eigenvalues' functional forms are quite involved,
yet it can be shown numerically that the system has one negative and four positive eigenvalues for
a wide range of parameter values. Consequently, the system is saddle-path stable as it contains one
predetermined and four jump variables.
10Comparison of (22) with (14) shows that internalization of the stock externality gives
rise to two opposing eects on the growth rate { which eect dominates, depends on
the parametrization of the model.
On the one hand, the decline of the capital-abatement ratio aects growth posi-
tively. On the other hand, (22) now accounts explicitly for the growth reducing eect
of the stock externality. We see from (14) that in Scenario 1 the marginal productiv-
ity of KA depends on  and (1   ) which determine the respective productivities of
capital and abatement. Internalization of S in (22) induces the marginal productivity















From (4) and the FOC for AL in (9), we get an expression for the output-capital

















As (23) only reects the production technology and the optimal input of AL, the same
functional relationship between YK and KA holds in Scenario 1. Yet, as the optimal
capital-abatement ratio is lower in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1, the output-capital
ratio is higher. Multiplying (23) by Ki
A gives Y i
A, the output-abatement ratio, which
positively depends on KA. Thus, the share of output used for abatement rises due to
the internalization of PG.
Whether the consumed share of output, Ci
Y , rises, depends crucially on whether
capital or abatement react stronger to the internalization. (5), (21) and the FOC for

















Using (5), (9) and (11) it can be shown that (24) also holds in Scenario 1.
When comparing CY in Scenario 1 and 2, recall that Ki
A and Y i
K dier in the two
scenarios. As the output-capital ratio in Scenario 2 is higher than in Scenario 1, a
higher share of output is available for non-investive purposes which exerts a positive
eect on CY . Additionally, internalization and the associated change in the returns
to abatement and capital induce the planner to devote a larger share of output to





A rises. Whether this has a positive or negative
11eect on the consumed share of output depends crucially on  Q 1, i.e. on whether
the intertemporal substitution or income eect following a change in the return on
investment dominates.11
Although we have seen that the capital-abatement ratio and the pollution stock
are lower than in Subsection 3.1, they are still suboptimal. As so far neither country
internalizes the negative spill-overs of its emissions on the other country, the capital-
abatement ratio as well as the pollution stock are still suboptimally high as will be
shown in the next subsection.
3.3 Scenario 3: Perfect Internalization
It is now assumed that both countries internalize the negative eects of their own
emissions not only on the domestic economy but also on the other country. As all
market failures are perfectly internalized, the resulting growth path is identical to the
growth path a global social planner would choose. The corresponding Hamiltonian















The resulting set of FOCs for each country is identical to the one of the previous




























A + a: (25)
(25) reects that an increase of the pollution stock induces negative externalities in
both countries which reduce the value of the joint objective function.
Following the same line of reasoning as in the previous scenario, it can be shown




























The rst term on the RHS of (26) shows the eect of integrating foreign damages
from domestic pollution. Compared to Scenario 2, perfect internalization doubles
11Please note that by inserting (23) and (24) into (20) it can be shown that (20) determines a
unique equilibrium value of K
i
A.
12the feedback eect of stock pollution damages on the capital-abatement ratio. This
induces a further decline of Ki
A and { as follows straightforwardly { the pollution
stock.
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As the case with respect to Ki
A in (26), perfect internalization strengthens the eects
observable in Scenario 2. Whether, however, the growth rate rises or falls due to the
internalization of foreign damages again depends on the parametrization of the model.
3.4 Scenario 4: Asymmetric Internalization
So far, it was assumed that all countries internalize the global and the local externality
symmetrically, yet the current debate on climate policies shows that this is hardly the
case. In reality, a number of countries largely ignore global externalities and focus
solely on the internalization of local externalities. This holds especially for developing
countries { although not exclusively { while industrialized, higher income countries
tend to take the feedback eects of the global externality (at least on their own
economy) into account. This is, for example, reected by the fact that all industrialized
countries (except for the US) committed to GHG emission reductions by ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol. Although our simplied set-up assumes that both countries are
identical with respect to preferences as well as production technologies such that
our analysis does not account for the systemic dierences between developing and
industrialized economies, we can derive basic implications on growth, abatement and
pollution that result from asymmetric internalization strategies.
In this section we assume that country h internalizes the local and the global
externality while country f solely takes the local externality into account. Under this
assumption, the optimization problem of country f again leads to the Hamiltonian of
Subsection 3.1 such that its optimal capital-abatement ratio is given by (13)
K
f












Assuming that country h takes the repercussions of global pollution at home but not
abroad into account, its optimization problem is represented by the Hamiltonian of
























which is always lower than K
f
A in (13).
Compared to Scenario 1, country h nds a lower capital-abatement ratio optimal
due to the internalization of the global externality such that it pollutes less. This
reduces the equilibrium pollution stock below the equilibrium level of Scenario 1. As
a consequence, country f lowers K
f
A, such that it pollutes less than in Scenario 1 but
still more than in Scenario 2. As a result, the pollution stock and thus Kh
A are higher
than in Scenario 2 as well.
Also, local pollution in country f decreases compared to a situation with symmetric
internalization as K
f
A is lower. Furthermore, as the two abatement activities are
conducted at the xed ratio 1 
 in country f, investment in AL also increases relative
to the capital stock which reduces local pollution further.
Country h experiences the opposite: Due to higher global pollution in comparison
to a situation with symmetric internalization, it conducts relatively less ALG. Parallel
to the development in country h, this induces a decrease in AL, thus strengthening
the eect on local pollution. So, in both countries the assumption of asymmetric
internalization not only aects the level of abatement regarding global pollution but
spills over to the abatement of local pollution.
From the preceding analysis of the planner solutions, the straightforward question
arises, how the dierent scenarios could be implemented in a market economy. De-
pending on the degree of internalization of the externalities, the instruments to be
employed as well as their optimal level will vary. Of special interest is the question of
optimal policies in the asymmetric case. How should the policy maker in country h
optimally react if country f ignores the global externality?
12Alternatively, we could assume that country h does consider international spill-overs (in which
case it would maximize the Hamiltonian of Subsection 3.3). Yet { comparable to the results of Scenario
2 and 3 presented previously { no additional qualitative eects would arise as only the magnitude of
the eects would change.
144 Market Solution and Environmental Policies
4.1 Symmetric Scenarios 1 to 3
Let us rst consider optimal policies a policy maker would adopt in the symmetric
Scenarios 1 to 3. As the market failures are solely due to environmental externalities,
we only have to consider the optimal design of environmental policy. Compared to an
economy in which market failures additionally arise from, e.g., knowledge spill-overs
or monopolistic competition as in Grimaud and Roug e (2003) or Pittel and Bretschger
(2009), this renders the analysis more straightforward.
In Scenario 1, both countries ignore the global externality such that only the
local externality remains to be internalized. In reality, the policy maker can obviously
choose between the implementation of dierent instruments. In this paper, however,
we stick for simplicity to environmental taxation and assume that a tax L is levied
on local pollution PL. (In the following we drop country indices for convenience
as optimal policies in both countries are identical along the BGP in the symmetric
scenarios.)13
In the market economy, households maximize their intertemporal utility subject





(r   ): (29)
Firms maximize prots which gives rise to FOCs for the two types of abatement and
capital. As individual rms do not internalize the externalities arising from pollu-
tion, their return to abatement solely consists in the taxes saved due to abatement.
Consequently, the FOCs for abatement and capital read
















i.e. the optimal tax rate has to equal the marginal externality. Inserting (32) into
the above FOCs and the Keynes-Ramsey rule replicates the growth path of Scenario
13Please note, that the stability properties of the system during the transition to the BGP are of
course identical to those of the planner scenarios when the planner conducts an optimal policy.
151. From (32) follows that the tax rate has to rise over time in order to mirror the
increasing scarcity of pollution in a growing economy.
In Scenario 2 both planners internalize the local and the domestic eects of the
global externality. As two dierent externalities are now considered, each policy maker
requires two instruments to internalize both. Although both pollution types arise as
a constant share of the capital input, two instruments are necessary as the induced
market failures are not perfectly correlated { in which case one policy instrument
would be sucient.14 In addition to the tax on local pollution we now consider a
second tax on the emission of the global pollutant, G.
Due to the additional tax the FOCs for ALG and K now read














while the FOC for AL remains unchanged. As the local externality was already per-
fectly internalized in Scenario 1, the optimal tax rule for local pollution is again given
by (32). The optimal tax on PG can then be shown to equal the marginal externality







Recall that (32) equalized the tax rate on local pollution, L, to the marginal damages
caused by PL today,  Y
PL. Equivalently, the marginal externality from PG, i.e.  Y
S
appears in (35). Yet, the optimal G is also determined by a second term, 1
CK+a, that
accounts for future externalities from today's addition to the stock of pollution. The
tax rate depends therefore negatively on the regeneration rate a, as faster regeneration
implies that pollution is absorbed faster. Also, a higher consumption-capital ratio,
i.e. lower investment in (polluting) capital compared to consumption, means that
less pollution is generated from today's production and therefore less is added to the
pollution stock.
Finally, let us consider Scenario 3 in which the same two externalities are in-
ternalized as in Scenario 2 such that the same tax instruments can be employed.
14Employing a unied tax rate on capital in this scenario could generate the optimal growth rate,
but would not lead to an optimal abatement mix as the price ratio between the two abatement types
would remain distorted.
16Regarding the local externality, (32) still represents the optimal tax rule while (35)
has to be adjusted in order to capture the international spill-overs from global pollu-








in order to account for the (identical) damages from PG caused at home and abroad.
4.2 Asymmetric Scenario 4
Given that, as assumed in Scenario 4, the two countries do not follow the same inter-
nalization strategy, the question arises which policy mix is optimal in this case. Let
us consider two dierent assumptions about the countries' behavior successively.
First, assume that either country takes the pollution that is generated in the other
country as exogenous. In this case the optimal policy rules are identical to those
derived in the previous subsection. More specically, both countries would set the
local pollution tax according to (32) and country h would tax PG according to (35).
Yet, although the policy rules are the same as in Subsection 4.1, the absolute levels
and growth rates of taxation would be dierent. As the stock of pollution in Scenario
4 is neither identical to Scenario 1 nor to Scenario 2, optimal growth and the optimal
level of economic activities also dier from Scenario 1 and 2 which entails dierent
values of the optimal tax rates.
Second, assume that the countries realize that the other country is following a
dierent internalization strategy. In this case they would perceive the outcome of the
previous paragraph as suboptimal. Country h, for example, would perceive global
pollution as too high compared to the symmetric Scenario 2. This case constitutes
the probably most realistic situation with respect to the current political situation.
One group of countries { here subsumed by country h { aims at the internalization of
the damages from global pollution while another group of countries { here represented
by country f { still ignores global externalities completely in its policy making.15
15Additionally, one could of course consider all other combinations of internalization strategies
between the two countries, for example, the case in which one country internalizes only domestic
externalities from PG while the other internalizes the global externality perfectly. As, however, the
basic implications for policy making remain the same, we focus on the above described combination
of strategies.
17One option for country h to attain the optimal pollution stock of Scenario 2 could
be to tax domestic pollution, local and/or global, at dierent rates than in the previous
sections. First, it could choose to tax global pollution at a higher rate, thus inducing
a further reduction which would yield as ancillary benet an accompanying reduction
of local pollution. This policy can, however, not be optimal. Under the policy rules
we derived in the previous sections, country h sets the tax rate, G, equal to the
marginal damage from pollution. For a G above this level, the marginal damages
would be smaller than the tax rate which would lower welfare. If the country would
{ as compensation for the higher G { lower the tax on local pollution, this could
result in the optimal local and global pollution levels, yet the costs of attaining these
optimal levels would be suboptimally high as the price ratio between the two types of
pollution would be distorted.
A second option would be to subsidize either pollution reduction or abatement
in country f. Subsidizing pollution reduction would leave the receiving country the
choice to reduce capital accumulation and/or abatement in order to reduce PG while
abatement subsidies solely set incentives to increase abatement activities. As we will
show in the following, the two policies, although closely related, have very dierent
implications for global welfare and especially the receiving country.
Subsidy on Pollution Reduction
First consider a subsidy to pollution reduction, sP, i.e. country h pays for a reduction
of P
f
G below its status quo level.16 In a world with perfect information this is feasible
since status quo pollution in country f is known to the policy maker in country h.
In reality, in which such perfect information may not be given, this policy would,
however, set incentives for the country f to exaggerate its pre-subsidization pollution.
If we stick to the assumption that no information related market failure arises, optimal
policy in this case is straightforward.
Prots of rms in country f are given by








L + sG(  PG   P
f
G) (37)
where  PG denotes the status quo level of pollution. Optimization leads to the following
16Status quo level refers to the level of pollution under sole internalization of the local externality





























where we have already considered that country f sets the tax rate on local pollution
at its optimal level, i.e. L =  Y
PL. Comparison of (39) to Scenario 2 shows that
the FOC for AL is corrected for by L. Further comparison of (38) and (40) to (17)
and (18) reveals that the subsidy that induces the optimal growth path of Scenario 2




This implies that the optimal subsidy rate has to follow the same rule as the tax rate
G in country h. To induce country f to reduce its pollution to the optimal level,
country h has to pay a marginal compensation which equals the marginal damages
from pollution. As the marginal damages that arise from PG are independent from
their geographical origin, the marginal avoided damage in country f due to the subsidy
exactly equals the marginal damage avoided in country h. Consequently, the subsidy
equals each, the marginal damages at home and abroad, i.e.














Thus, for country h to induce optimal pollution,17 it has to forego its revenues
from taxing Ph
G to pay the subsidy to country f. If it receives no additional benets
from reducing pollution, country h will be indierent between subsidization and not
intervening in country f. Hence, if raising and transferring the public funds needed for
subsidization would be accompanied by any social costs, country h would rationally
decide not to subsidize country f. Country f, on the other hand, prots from the
subsidy, as the externalities from global pollution decline and it additionally receives
the subsidy from country h.
17Subsidization at rate sG from (42) induces K
f
A as well as g
f
C to be equal to the respective BGP
values in Scenario 2, (20) and (22), see Appendix 6.3.
19In comparison to other possible subsidy schemes { as, e.g., subsidizing abatement
(see next paragraph) { the advantage of subsidizing pollution reduction is that it
corrects not only for the returns to ALG-abatement but also for the returns to capital.
The price ratios between the two abatement types as well as between abatement and
capital are thus optimal. From a global perspective, subsidizing pollution reduction is
optimal as it can achieve the rst-best allocation, yet due to the uneven distribution
of gains, this policy might not be implemented. As we will see in the next paragraph,
abatement subsidization { the second option for country h { might have a better
chance of being implemented. Yet, while it equally corrects for the distortion in the
relative price of the two abatement types, the price ratio between abatement and
capital remains distorted and the rst-best solution is consequently not implemented.
Subsidy on Abatement
In the real world, the advantage of subsidizing abatement in comparison to pollution
reduction would be its better observability and thus the lower potential to exaggerate
abatement activities in order to receive higher payments. In our world, however,
information is perfect, such that observability plays no role regarding a comparison of
the two instruments.
If country h subsidizes abatement ALG at rate sA, prots of rms in country f are
given by
f = Y f   rfKf   A
f





















rf = (1   )Y
f
K: (46)
Again, the price of AL is set equal to its social return. Comparison of the FOC for


















In contrast to the subsidy on pollution reduction, the subsidy on abatement has to
mirror not only the relative shadow price of pollution but also has to take the produc-



















, into account. Consequently,
20the higher the productivity, the more abatement is optimal and the higher the subsidy
rate. The question arises whether this optimal subsidy rate is higher or lower than the
induced marginal damage reduction in country h. As pollution is constant along the








< 1 holds in the long run.18







, and the increase
of the shadow price of pollution,  
f
f , exactly oset each other, such that the social
return to abatement { and thus the subsidy rate sA { is constant over time. The
aggregate abatement subsidy paid to country f, thus grows at rate gALG.
The subsidy rate on pollution reduction, on the other hand, increases over time as
pollution gets scarcer and thus more valuable. Taking into account that the pollution
stock and CK are constant along BGP and that gY = gALG, we see from (42) that
sG grows at rate gALG. As PG is constant over time, this implies that the aggregate
subsidy on pollution reduction grows at the same rate as the aggregate subsidy on
abatement.
So, although it might seem at rst glance that country h should favor subsidizing
abatement in contrast to pollution reduction (as the respective subsidy rate does not
increase over time), the expenditures for both subsidy schemes actually grow at the
same rate.
With respect to the accumulation of capital, (46) shows that a subsidy on abate-
ment does not aect the FOC for capital. As the subsidy does not capture the negative
externality from capital, the return to capital as well as growth are higher than in
Scenario 2. In order to show this, substitute (44) and (46) into the Keynes-Ramsey
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A in (48) and (49) are identical if abatement is subsidized at rate (47), it
18sA from (47) induces K
f
A to be equal to (20), see Appendix 6.4.
21follows that country f grows at a suboptimally high rate due to the uninternalized
externalities from capital.
If country h would not only internalize the domestic damages from PLG but also
the transnational externalities, the gap between the growth rate under abatement
subsidization and the optimal (in this case also rst-best) growth rate would even be
wider.
Summing up, subsidizing abatement or pollution reduction both succeed in attain-
ing the optimal global pollution stock. Yet, the consequences for country f and global
welfare dier as under abatement subsidization country f accumulates capital faster
and therefore grows at a higher rate than is welfare optimal.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed local and global pollution in the framework of a 2-country en-
dogenous growth model. It considered two dierent technologies to mitigate pollution,
one of which reduced only local pollution while the other mitigated global pollution as
well. We rst derived implications for the optimal abatement mix, capital accumula-
tion and growth under dierent assumptions about the degree to which the local and
global externalities are internalized by a planner. Subsequently, policies were derived
in order to implement the growth paths of the dierent planner scenarios. Special
attention was paid to the case of asymmetric internalization.
It was shown that pollution declines with an increasing degree of internalization
while the eect on growth depends on the model's parametrization. Increasing the
scope of internalization on the one hand hurts growth as relatively less capital is
accumulated but also fosters growth as the productivity of capital increases due to
higher abatement. The strength though not the direction of the eects that result from
internalizing the global externality depends on whether countries internalize only the
domestic or also the transnational eects from the global pollutant.
Although both types of pollution are caused by capital accumulation in our model,
two instruments are required to achieve the rst-best solution, for example a tax on
local pollution and a tax on the emission of global pollutants. With respect to local
pollution, it was shown that optimal taxation requires to set the tax rate equal to the
marginal damage to current production. Optimal taxation of the global pollutant,
however, also has to take into account that current emissions add to the pollution
22stock and thus cause damages not only to production today but also to production in
the future.
The paper also considered asymmetric internalization scenarios, i.e. situations in
which the two countries internalize the externalities to dierent degrees. Without
international environmental policy neither country attains the development path it
considers to be optimal in this case. We focused on the realistic case that a country
that internalizes the global externality strives to implement the global pollution stock
it considers to be optimal through international environmental policy. We analyzed
two policy options { a subsidy on the reduction of pollution and a subsidy on abate-
ment. It was shown that either policy succeeds in implementing the optimal stock of
global pollution. Yet, the global welfare optimum can only be achieved by subsidizing
pollution reduction since subsidizing abatement does not correct for the negative ex-
ternalities from capital accumulation. Consequently, capital accumulation and growth
are suboptimally high in the subsidy receiving country.
In our analysis we have assumed perfect information. Although, we shortly pointed
to implications of imperfect information, a more detailed analysis of its consequences
as well as of strategic incentives arising in the case of international environmental
policy are certainly desirable. Also, dropping the simplifying assumption of identical
technologies and preferences would allow, for example, to better capture asymmetric
internalization in the case of industrialized and developing countries. Integrating these
aspects into the present framework might yield further interesting results.
236 Appendix
6.1 Scenario 2: Derivation of BGP Capital-abatement Ratio
From the FOCs for ALG and K, (17) and (18), we get


















From dierentiating (17) with respect to time, we get a second expression for the
dynamics of gi















Along the BGP gi
C = gY i = gKi = gaF
i = gAi
LG again has to hold, such that we get




from (5) where we employed (9), we get
gi =  Ci
K (53)





































Finally, by employing (15) we can now derive the capital-abatement ratio along the
BGP to equal (20).
To derive the optimal output-capital ratio rearrange (17) to get
Y i
KKi


































K+a + (1   )
(57)
24such that Y i












K+a + (1   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3
5: (58)


































6.2 Scenario 2: Derivation of Optimal G




= 1   (1   )YKKA: (61)




ALG has to hold in the optimum.
Equating the two expressions shows that the tax rate has to equal the negative ratio















YKKA + a (63)










Combining (62) and (64) nally gives the optimal tax rate on PG in (35).





Firms in country f that receive a subsidy for pollution reduction will set K
f
A as follows:
Dividing (38) by (39) gives A
f









































Substituting this expression into (38) and rearranging gives the capital-output ratio































































































Substituting this expression into (67), considering that, along the BGP and given (42),
S = 2P
f
G holds and rearranging gives the capital-abatement ratio of Scenario 2, (20).
The growth rate for country f with pollution reduction subsidies can be derived




























A is equal to (20) this gives the optimal growth rate (22).
6.4 Derivation of K
f
A under sA

















































YK = (1   sA)((1   )K
f






































Substituting this expression into (73), considering that along the BGP S = 2P
f
G holds
and rearranging gives the capital-abatement ratio of Scenario 2, (20).
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